G.R. No. 183122, June 15, 2011
Facts:
On
28 April 1989, GMC and the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) which provided, among other terms, the latter’s representation of the
collective bargaining unit for a three-year term made to retroact to 1 December
1988. On 29 November 1991 or one day before the expiration of the subject CBA,
the Union sent a draft CBA proposal to GMC, with a request for
counter-proposals from the latter. In view of GMC’s failure to comply with said
request, the Union commenced the complaint for unfair labor practice which was
dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, said dismissal was reversed and set
aside in the 30 January 1998 decision rendered by the NLRC, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 21, 1993 is hereby
VACATED and SET ASIDE and a new one issued ordering the imposition upon the
respondent company of the complainant union[‘s] draft CBA proposal for the
remaining two years duration of the original CBA which is from December 1, 1991
to November 30, 1993…
SO ORDERED.
Since
the abovementioned decision was reconsidered and set aside by the NLRC, the
Union filed the petitions for certiorari before the CA, which in turn reversed
and set aside the NLRC’s resolution and reinstated the aforesaid 30 January
1998 decision. Aggrieved by the CA’s resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration, GMC elevated the case to this Court via the petition for
review on certiorari. In a decision dated 11 February 2004 rendered by the
Court’s then Second Division, the CA’s 30 January 1998 decision and 26 October
2000 resolution were affirmed,12 upon
the following findings and conclusions, to wit:
GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the
proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in
bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer
represented the worker, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly
baseless.
We hold that GMC’s refusal to make a counter
proposal to the union’s proposal for CBA negotiation is an indication of its
bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the
bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to
bargain collectively.
Failing to comply with the mandatory
obligation to submit a reply to the union’s proposals, GMC violated its duty to
bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice. Perforce, the
Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the circumstances, guilty
of unfair labor practice.
x x x x
x x x (I)t would be unfair to the union and
its members if the terms and conditions contained in the old CBA would continue
to be imposed on GMC’s employees for the remaining two (2) years of the CBA’s
duration. We are not inclined to gratify GMC with an extended term of the old
CBA after it resorted to delaying tactics to prevent negotiations. Since it was
GMC which violated the duty to bargain collectively, it had lost its statutory
right to negotiate or renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA
proposed by the union.
x x x x
Under ordinary circumstances, it is not
obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or
agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be allowed
with impunity to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures.
Thus, by imposing on GMC the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union,
in our view, the interests of equity and fair play were properly served and
both the parties regained equal footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the
negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA.
With
the ensuing finality of the foregoing decision, the Union filed a motion for
issuance of a writ of execution dated 21 March 2005, to enforce the claims of
the covered employees which it computed in the sum of P433,786,786.36
and to require GMC to produce said employee’s time cards for the purpose of
computing their overtime pay, night shift differentials and labor standard
benefits for work rendered on rest days, legal holidays and special holidays. GMC
filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the imposed CBA has full force and effect
considering that it was not agreed upon by the Union and GMC.
Held:
Anent its period of
effectivity, Article XIV of the imposed CBA provides that "(t)his
Agreement shall be in full force and effect for a period of five (5) years from
1 December 1991, provided that sixty (60) days prior to the lapse of the third
year of effectivity hereof, the parties shall open negotiations on economic
aspect for the fourth and fifth years effectivity of this Agreement." Considering that no new CBA had been,
in the meantime, agreed upon by GMC and the Union, we find that the CA
correctly ruled in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02226 that, pursuant to Article 253 of
the Labor Code, the provisions of
the imposed CBA continues to have full force and effect until a new CBA has
been entered into by the parties. Article 253 mandates the parties to keep the status
quo and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the
60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties. In
the same manner that it does not provide for any exception nor qualification on
which economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain its force and
effect, the law does not
distinguish between a CBA duly agreed upon by the parties and an imposed CBA
like the one under consideration.