Showing posts with label union. Show all posts
Showing posts with label union. Show all posts

Sunday, September 15, 2013

GENERAL MILLING CORP. - INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU) vs. GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 183122, June 15, 2011

Facts:
On 28 April 1989, GMC and the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which provided, among other terms, the latter’s representation of the collective bargaining unit for a three-year term made to retroact to 1 December 1988. On 29 November 1991 or one day before the expiration of the subject CBA, the Union sent a draft CBA proposal to GMC, with a request for counter-proposals from the latter. In view of GMC’s failure to comply with said request, the Union commenced the complaint for unfair labor practice which was dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, said dismissal was reversed and set aside in the 30 January 1998 decision rendered by the NLRC, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 21, 1993 is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE and a new one issued ordering the imposition upon the respondent company of the complainant union[‘s] draft CBA proposal for the remaining two years duration of the original CBA which is from December 1, 1991 to November 30, 1993…
SO ORDERED.

Since the abovementioned decision was reconsidered and set aside by the NLRC, the Union filed the petitions for certiorari before the CA, which in turn reversed and set aside the NLRC’s resolution and reinstated the aforesaid 30 January 1998 decision. Aggrieved by the CA’s resolution denying its motion for reconsideration, GMC elevated the case to this Court via the petition for review on certiorari. In a decision dated 11 February 2004 rendered by the Court’s then Second Division, the CA’s 30 January 1998 decision and 26 October 2000 resolution were affirmed,12 upon the following findings and conclusions, to wit:
GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the worker, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless.
We hold that GMC’s refusal to make a counter proposal to the union’s proposal for CBA negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.
Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union’s proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice. Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the circumstances, guilty of unfair labor practice.
x x x x
x x x (I)t would be unfair to the union and its members if the terms and conditions contained in the old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMC’s employees for the remaining two (2) years of the CBA’s duration. We are not inclined to gratify GMC with an extended term of the old CBA after it resorted to delaying tactics to prevent negotiations. Since it was GMC which violated the duty to bargain collectively, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union.
x x x x
Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be allowed with impunity to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. Thus, by imposing on GMC the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the interests of equity and fair play were properly served and both the parties regained equal footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA.

With the ensuing finality of the foregoing decision, the Union filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution dated 21 March 2005, to enforce the claims of the covered employees which it computed in the sum of P433,786,786.36 and to require GMC to produce said employee’s time cards for the purpose of computing their overtime pay, night shift differentials and labor standard benefits for work rendered on rest days, legal holidays and special holidays. GMC filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether the imposed CBA has full force and effect considering that it was not agreed upon by the Union and GMC.

Held:
Anent its period of effectivity, Article XIV of the imposed CBA provides that "(t)his Agreement shall be in full force and effect for a period of five (5) years from 1 December 1991, provided that sixty (60) days prior to the lapse of the third year of effectivity hereof, the parties shall open negotiations on economic aspect for the fourth and fifth years effectivity of this Agreement." Considering that no new CBA had been, in the meantime, agreed upon by GMC and the Union, we find that the CA correctly ruled in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02226 that, pursuant to Article 253 of the Labor Code, the provisions of the imposed CBA continues to have full force and effect until a new CBA has been entered into by the parties. Article 253 mandates the parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the old CBA and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. In the same manner that it does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain its force and effect, the law does not distinguish between a CBA duly agreed upon by the parties and an imposed CBA like the one under consideration.

Wednesday, August 28, 2013

George & Peter Lines, Inc. vs. Associated Labor Unions (ALU)

George & Peter Lines, Inc. vs. Associated Labor Unions (ALU)
GR No. L-51602, January 17, 1985

Facts:
ALU filed for a petition for Direct Certification, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all rank and file employees of G&PL.
G&PL opposed the petition stating that ALU does not represent the majority of the employees concerned, especially in the light of the claim of more than 80% of the licensed and unlicensed crew of its vessels that they are not members of any union and have no desire to join any.
The Med-Arbiter issued an Order directly certifying ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of G&PL employees.
G&PL moved for reconsideration alleging that a certification election (CE) should be called for the interest of fairness and justice.

Issue:
Whether a direct certification would suffice to prove the alleged majority representation status of a union

Held: No, it would not suffice.
Certification election is the best and most appropriate means of ascertaining the will of the employees as to their choice of an exclusive bargaining representative. That there are no competing Unions involved should not alter that principle, the freedom of choice by the employees being the primordial consideration besides the fact that the employees can still choose between ALU and No Union. Even if the withdrawals of the employees concerned were submitted after the Petition for direct certification had been filed, the doubt as to the majority representation of the Union has arisen and it is best to determine the true sentiment of the employees through a certification election.

Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) vs. Secretary of Labor

Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) vs. Secretary of Labor
GR No. 107792, March 2, 1998

Facts:
The employees of Permex Producer and Exporter Corporation voted "No Union" during the January 15, 1991 certification election (CE).
On March 11, 1991, the SMP, which is composed of some employees of Permex Producer, was registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On August 16, 1991, SMP requested Permex Producer to recognize SMP as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of Permex Producer.
On October 19, 1991, Permex Producer recognized SMP, and because of such recognition, Permex entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with SMP on December 1, 1991. The CBA was ratified on December 9 & 10, 1991 by the majority of the rank and file employees of Permex. On December 13, 1991, such CBA was certified by the DOLE.
On February 25, 1992, the National Labor Federation (NFL) filed a petition for CE, but was dismissed. NFL's appeal led to its inclusion in the options for CE. SMP moved for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether support by the majority of the employees makes a CBA entered by a union valid and binding

Held: No, it does not.
It is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself.

This is especially so because, in this case, the recognition given to the union came barely ten (10) months after the employees had voted "no union" in the certification election conducted in the company. As pointed out by respondent Secretary of Labor in his decision, there can be no determination of a bargaining representative within a year of the proclamation of the results of the certification election. Here the results, which showed that 61% of the employees voted for "no union," were certified only on February 25, 1991 but on December 1, 1991 Permex Producer already recognized the union and entered into a CBA with it.

Algire vs. De Mesa

Algire vs. De Mesa
GR No. 97622, October 19, 1994

Facts:
Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU) filed a petition for the holding of an election of union officers to represent the union in the collective bargaining agreement with the management of Universal robina Textile. the employees were to choose between Algire, et al. and de Mesa et al.

Issue:
Whether the election held was a consent election

Held: Yes, it was.
The election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent election and not a certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election.