Millare vs. Hernando (151 SCRA 484)
GR No. L-555480, 6/30/1987
Feliciano, J.:
Facts:
A
five-year Contract of Lease was executed between Millare as lessor and the Spouses
Co as lessee. They agreed on a monthly rental rate of P350 of the “People’s
Restaurant” until May 31, 1980.
During
the last week of May 1980, Millare informed the Co spouses that they could
continue leasing the property so long as they were amenable to paying P1,200 a
month. The Spouses Co counter-offered with P700 a month. At this point, Millare
allegedly stated that the amount of monthly rentals could be resolved at a
later time since “the matter is simple among us”, which alleged remark was
supposedly taken by the spouses Co to mean that the Contract of Lease had been
renewed, prompting them to continue occupying the subject premises and to
forego their search for a substitute place to rent. In contrast, the lessor
flatly denied ever having considered, much less offered, a renewal of the
Contract of Lease.
On July 22 and 28,
1980, Millare sent demand letters requesting them to vacate as she had no
intention of renewing the Contract of Lease, which had expired. The spouses Co
signified their intention to deposit the P700 monthly rental in court, in view
of Mrs. Millare’s refusal to accept their counter-offer.
As the parties were
filing suits against each other in court, the trial judge rendered a “Judgment
by Default” dated 26 November 1980 ordering the renewal of the lease contract
for a term of 5 years counted from the expiration date of the original lease
contract, and fixing monthly rentals thereunder at P700.00 a month, payable in
arrears.
Issue:
Whether the court may order the renewal of the Contract
of Lease for another five-year term at P700 a month
Held:
No,
it cannot order the renewal of the Contract of Lease.
The
respondent judge cited Articles 1197 and 1670 of the Civil Code to sustain the
“Judgment by Default” by which he ordered the renewal of the lease for another
term of five years and fixed monthly rentals thereunder at P700.00 a month.
Article 1197 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
“If
the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances
it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration
thereof.
The
courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will
of the debtor.
In
every case, the courts shall determine such period as may, under the
circumstances, have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by
the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.” (Italics supplied.)
The first paragraph of
Article 1197 is clearly inapplicable, since the Contract of Lease did in fact
fix an original period of five years, which had expired. It is also clear from paragraph
13 of the Contract of Lease that the parties reserved to themselves the faculty
of agreeing upon the period of the renewal contract. The second paragraph of Article
1197 is equally clearly inapplicable since the duration of the renewal period
was not left to the will of the lessee alone, but rather to the will of both
the lessor and the lessee. Most importantly, Article 1197 applies only where a
contract of lease clearly exists. Here, the contract was not renewed at all,
there was in fact no contract at all the period of which could have been fixed.
Article 1670 of the
Civil Code reads thus:
“If
at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing left
for 15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor and unless a notice to the
contrary by either party has previously been given. It is understood that there
is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for
the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original
contract shall be revived.” (Italics supplied.)
The parties do not pretend
that the continued occupancy of the leased premises after 31 May 1980, the date
of expiration of the contract, was with the acquiescence of the lessor. The implied
new lease could not possibly have a period of five years, but rather would have
been a month-to-month lease since the rentals (under the original contract)
were payable on a monthly basis. At the latest, an implied new lease (had one
arisen) would have expired as of the end of July 1980 in view of the written
demands served by the petitioner upon the private respondents to vacate the previously
leased premises,
It follows that the
respondent judge’s decision requiring renewal of the lease has no basis in law
or in fact. Save in the limited and exceptional situations envisaged in
Articles 1197 and 1670 of the Civil Code, which do not obtain here, courts have
no authority to prescribe the terms and conditions of a contract for the
parties. As pointed out by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic vs. Philippine
Long Distance Telephone, Co.,
“[P]arties
cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between
them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to
stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual
system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted
by violence, intimidation or undue influence (Article 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
No comments:
Post a Comment